Carolanne Hines
6 October 2013
Wade v. Smith, 461 U.S. 30
(1983)
CASE FACTS
In
Wade v. Smith
(1983), petitioner Wade was incarcerated at Algoa Reformatory, a
detention center for young offenders during 1976. Because of prior
incidents causing Wade to fear for his safety, he voluntarily
admitted himself into protective custody. However, due to
disciplinary issues while Wade was in protective custody, he was put
into administrative segregation with another inmate. Defendant,
Smith, was a guard on duty at Algoa Reformatory. After Wade was
placed in a cell with another inmate, Smith placed a third inmate in
the cell with Wade when he first came on duty. The third inmate
placed in the cell had been put in administrative segregation for
fighting. The two other inmates harassed, beat, and sexually
assaulted Wade.
This is not the first incident of violence while Smith was on duty.
A few weeks prior, another inmate was beaten to death while in
administrative segregation. Also, there was no real reason for a
third inmate to be put into the same cell as Wade and the other
inmate; there was another cell in the block with only one inmate
there. Smith had made no effort to determine whether or not there was
another cell available to place the third inmate in.
Wade
filed suit against Smith and three other prison guards for violating
his Eight Amendment rights – cruel and unusual punishment.
Wade felt that because of his history and the circumstances the
guards should have know that an assault was imminent.
ISSUE/ISSUES
What
types of immunities do prison guards have in a situation where an
inmate feels his/her Eighth Amendment Right have been violated due to
negligence or reckless conduct on part of an employee of the criminal
justice system? Yes, a petitioner has the right to collect punitive
damages from an employee of the criminal justice system if their
negligence or recklessness resulted in the injury of another.
COURT DECISION AND
RATIONALE
The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding “A jury
may be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when
the defendant's conduct involves reckless or callous indifference to
the plaintiff's federally protected rights, as well as when it is
motivated by evil motive or intent” and “The common law... allows
recovery of punitive damages in tort cases not only for actual
malicious intent, but also for reckless indifference to the rights of
others. Neither the policies nor the purposes of § 1983 require a
departure from the common law rule.”
The Supreme Court also ascertained
“There is no merit to petitioner's contention that actual malicious
intent should be the standard for punitive damages because the
deterrent purposes of such damages would be served only if the
threshold for those damages is higher in every case than the
underlying standard for liability in the first instance.”
When
the case was taken to trial, a federal judge stated that “Wade
could make out an Eighth Amendment violation only by showing
"physical abuse of such base, inhumane and barbaric proportions
as to shock the sensibilities.” Also, the federal judge commented
“Further, because of Smith's qualified immunity as a prison
guard, see Procunier
v. Navarette (1978), the
judge instructed the jury that Wade could recover only if the
defendants were guilty of "gross negligence" (defined as "a
callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the consequences
of one's act or failure to act") or "[e]gregious failure to
protect" (defined as "a flagrant or remarkably bad failure
to protect") Wade.”The lower court awarded Wade punitive
damages in the form of $5,000 and compensatory damages in the form of
$25,000. Also, most federal courts and state courts agree that
punitive damage awards do not require only malicious intent. They
also consider standards of negligence, recklessness, or other
activities that fall short of maliciousness.
In the
case, Smith argues that “the deterrent and punitive purposes of
punitive damages are served only if the threshold for punitive
damages is higher in every case than the underlying standard for
liability in the first instance.” However, Justice Brennan
disagrees in that punitive damages are not a right to a prevailing
plaintiff and are not the main course for constructing a deterrent
for reckless behavior. Also, Smith feels that “too low a standard
of exposure to punitive damages in cases such as this threatens to
undermine the policies of his qualified immunity as a prison guard.”
Justice Brennan feels this is an overstatement of his immunity.
Overall,
the main objective in the Supreme Court's decision to affirm the
decision of the lower court is based in the fact that not only
malicious actions against another person merits punitive damages, but
also acting a a reckless or negligent manner can also cause someone
to incur punitive damages. Also, the court shows that punitive
damages are not means for a deterrent because punitive damages are
not a right for a prevailing plaintiff.
DISSENTING AND CONCURRING
OPINIONS
Justice
Brennan delivered the opinion of the court, while Justices White,
Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall agreed. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Powell, and Burger dissented.
In
Justice Rehnquist's dissent, he states that the justices who affirmed
the decision should be at fault for construing § 1983 legislation
with recent tort decisions. Justice Rehnquist's main concern is the
balance between the original legislation and newer torts that change
the way § 1983 is interpreted.
The
main gist of Justice Rehnquist's descent is that receiving punitive
damages is not the singular remediation for a § 1983 action. He
argues that congress would not be in support this decision. Justice
Rehnquist also casts doubt on whether or not whether or not
punitive damages should be awarded in a § 1983 action. He asserts
that “the phrase "for redress" at the end of the section
means that Congress intended to limit recovery to compensatory
damages.”
Justice Rehnquist also surmises that
congress would not approve of punitive damages as the sole
remediation for a § 1983, although Justice Brennan disagrees
stating, “Congress did approve a punitive civil remedy in an 1870
Civil Rights Act. Act of May 31, 1870, § 2, 16 Stat. 140 (creating
private cause of action for fixed penalty on behalf of persons
suffering racial discrimination in voting registration) [and in] 1889
Colo. Sess. Laws 64 (enacting punitive damages statute, including
awards for 'wanton and reckless disregard,'...” Justice Brennan,
rebutting Justice Rehnquist's opinion, stated “These statutes do
not support Justice Rehnquist's speculation that Congress acted
expressly when it intended to approve punitive damages, since both
statutes created new remedies not available at common law; moreover,
they undercut his argument that Congress was hostile to punitive
civil remedies in favor of private parties.”
CASE SIGNIFICANCE AND
ANALYSIS
This
case is important in that it establishes standards to which punitive
damages can be awarded for certain types of negligent or reckless
conduct, regardless of whether or not the actor's intent was
malicious under § 1983.
Wade
v. Smith
(1983) also relates to the case Procunier
v. Navarette, 434
U. S. 555 (1978). In this case, a prison inmate filed a § 1983
action against prison officials for interfering with his outgoing
mail. The petitioner, Navarette, alleged that several prison officers
and supervisors were failing to mail some of his outgoing
correspondences during the 15 months he was incarcerated. Navarette
expressed the importance of these correspondence because they were
addressed to lawyers, law students, members of the media, and inmates
in other facilities. Navarette filed a § 1983 action against six
prison officials involved in tampering with his mail. His suit
included violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights –
freedom of speech and due process.
In
this case, the Supreme Court held that “Petitioners, as
state prison officials, were entitled to immunity unless they "knew
or reasonably should have known" that the action they took with
respect to respondent's mail would violate his federal constitutional
rights, or they took the action with the "malicious intention"
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to
respondent” and “There was no established First and Fourteenth
Amendment right protecting state prisoners' mail privileges at the
time in question, and therefore, as a matter of law, there was no
basis for rejecting the immunity defense on the ground that
petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct
violated a constitutional right.”
Procunier
v. Navarette
(1978) is similar in that both cases deal with constitutional rights
issues arising out of the prison system. Where one case deals with
actual physical injury, and the other deals with interfering with
correspondence, the Supreme Court ruled that the state prison
officials would have had immunity if they were ignorant of the fact
that this would have violated Navarette's constitutional rights.
Also, the Supreme Court affirmed that there is no constitutional
right, in the first place, protecting a prisoner's correspondence.
Wade
v. Smith
(1983) affects the criminal justice system in that recklessness or
negligence can be a liability. There is no more “ignorance”
defense. The defendant, Smith, could not have used this as his
defense. Now, anyone working in the criminal justice system will be
liable for their actions both malicious and negligent
when it pertains to violating someone's constitutional rights. This
decision increases an officer's liability in that punitive damages
can be awarded for both malicious intent and recklessness, however
punitive damages are not the sole means of remediation for a
prevailing plaintiff.
Because of the increased liability
toward a police officer, additional training and consideration must
be taken into account. Obviously, officers are given ethics training
which allows them to utilize their discretion in order to make a fair
and rational decision. This training also allows them to use their
best judgment in a situation and not bend or delve into
maliciousness. However, with the standard lowered to include
negligence, additional training may be required concerning the use of
discretion. Smith used his discretion in placing the third inmate
into the cell with Wade and the second inmate, however he did not
have enough applicable or situational information to ascertain
whether or not that was a “right” or just decision. Officers who
undergo training for discretionary use should also be taught to
properly balance thorough investigation with split-second decision
making. This allows an officer to ensure all avenues are investigated
before making a decision that could affect someone's health and
safety while being able to make a rational and just decision if
pressed.
STANDARDS
This
decision sets a new standard in liability for police officers. They
now must be more aware of their surroundings and the impact of their
decisions, regardless of intent.
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