Case Brief: Pennsylvania Dept. of State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)

Carolanne Hines
3 November 2013


Pennsylvania Dept. of State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)

CASE FACTS

Nancy Drew Suders was hired on by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) as a communications operator. While employed with the department Suders was subjected to ongoing sexual harassment by her male superiors ranging from sexually obscene conversations about bestiality in her presence, to sexual gestures, and sexual acts. Suders told one of the officers who was one of the main perpetrators of the sexual harassment that what he was doing was wrong, and he reacted by repeating the gesture and harassment more vociferously and frequently. Also, many of her male coworkers and supervisors demeaned her intelligence and ability to perform the job.
The next main incident that led to Suders resigning was being accused of taking home a missing accident report by one of her male superiors. She went to the PSP's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, Virginia Smith-Elliott, who counseled her to file a complaint and gave her a phone number. There was no follow up to that meeting. Two months later, Suders communicated with Smith-Elliott again, stating she was “being harassed and afraid.” Smith-Elliott counseled Suders, again, to file a complaint, but did not provide her with the information on how to file a complaint. Suders felt that Smith-Elliott was “insensitive” and “unhelpful”.
Two days after that, Suders was arrested for theft of documents pertaining to an employment test she had taken. Suders was told by the same male superiors who have been harassing her that she failed the requirements test. She found her completed, ungraded testing documents in a locker room drawer, and realized the documents had never been forwarded to the appropriate supervisor for grading – she did not fail the exam, as her supervisors had said. She took the documents from the locker room. When her supervisors realized she had found the ungraded exams, they devised a plan for her to get arrested for the theft of the documents. She was taken to an interrogation room and read her Miranda Rights. She was adamant she wanted to resign, and initially her supervisors refused to let her go, but eventually acquiesced. The PSP never filed theft charges against Suders.
In September of 2000, Suders filed suit against the PSP in Federal District Court, stating, inter alia, that she was sexually harassed and discharged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Right act of 1964.


ISSUE/ISSUES

If an employee resigns from their position due to a hostile workplace environment brought on by ongoing harassment, can they still file suit against the employer? Yes.


COURT DECISION AND RATIONALE

The Federal District Court concluded Suders' supervisors had created a hostile work environment because of their ongoing sexual harassment, however that the PSP was not vicariously liable. The crux of the Federal District Court's decision was that even though Suders' supervisors had created a hostile work environment, the PSP was not liable for the actions of the supervisors. Using the decisions made in Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), which distinguished between “a tangible employment action” as a result of supervisor harassment and supervisor harassment without the “employment action”. However, if there is no “employment action”, as discussed by the two cases, the affirmative defense for a employer to avoid liability is for the employer to have policy that promptly and decisively initiates the investigation of the reports of sexual harassment and corrects the behavior. Also, the plaintiff must have taken advantage of the policy that allows for reporting of sexual harassment and the correction of the actions. In essence, the employer must have a policy in place and exercise care when dealing with allegations of sexual harassment and the petitioner must have used the available resources to report the harassment. The district court also held that because she resigned before her claims could be properly resolved, the PSP could not be held liable. The District Court, however, did not address her constructive discharge claim.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court. The Court of Appeals held that there was a pattern of ongoing sexual harassment on part of Suters' supervisors. The Court of Appeals also acknowledged Suters' constructive discharge claim under Title VII, stating “she suffered harassment or discrimination so intolerable that a reasonable person in the same position would have felt compelled to resign; and (2) the employee's reaction to the workplace situation—that is, his or her decision to resign—was reasonable given the totality of circumstances.” Because the Court of Appeals considered Suters' constructive discharge as a “tangible employment action” and no longer under the same guidelines as Faragher and Burlington Industries.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held “To establish “constructive discharge,” a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response. An employer may assert theEllerth/Faragher affirmative defense to such a claim unless the plaintiff quit in reasonable response to an adverse action officially changing her employment status or situation, e.g., a humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which she would face unbearable working conditions.”

DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINIONS

The decision was an 8-1, with Justices Ginsburg, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Kennedy, and Breyer agreeing. Justice Thomas dissented.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, stating “Suders' claim is of the same genre as the hostile work environment claims the Court analyzed in Ellerth and Faragher. Essentially, Suders presents a "worse case" harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point. Like the harassment considered in our pathmarking decisions, harassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation may be effected through co-worker conduct, unofficial supervisory conduct, or official company acts. Unlike an actual termination, which is always effected through an official act of the company, a constructive discharge need not be. A constructive discharge involves both an employee's decision to leave and precipitating conduct: The former involves no official action; the latter, like a harassment claim without any constructive discharge assertion, may or may not involve official action.”
In Justice Thomas' dissent, he references the inception of the idea of constructive discharge. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) first developed the idea when employers were coercing employees to resign due to the employee's union activities. The NLRB requires two things for an employee's resignation to be considered a constructive discharge – “First, the employer must impose burdens upon the employee that "cause, and [are] intended to cause, a change in his working conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to resign. Second, it must be shown that those burdens were imposed because of the employee's union activities.”
Basing the standards of constructive discharge on the criteria set forth by the NLRB, Justice Thomas disagrees with the assertion that Suters' resignation was constructive discharge because Suters' supervisors did not specifically harass her to force her to resign. Justice Thomas states “The Court has now adopted a definition of constructive discharge, however, that does not in the least resemble actual discharge. The Court holds that to establish "`constructive discharge,'" a plaintiff must "show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that [the employee's] resignation qualified as a fitting response." Under this rule, it is possible to allege a constructive discharge absent any adverse employment action.”
In sum, the main difference between the Supreme Court's opinion, delivered by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Thomas' dissent is what qualifies a constructive discharge. Justice Thomas defers to the initial definition, while the rest of the Justices create a new standard for constructive discharge.


CASE SIGNIFICANCE AND ANALYSIS

This case is important in that it sets a new standard for workplaces and their policies on harassment. Most employees do not receive any type of harassment training or receive any in depth instruction of the harassment policy of the work place. This decision prompts employers to reconsider their harassment policies simply for the sake of liability and maintaining an effective and productive workplace.
This is especially important for criminal justice agencies because they are public entities – they are not private businesses. If an public agency is held liable for anything and has to pay punitive damages, this comes out of their budget and is paid by the taxpayers, whereas private businesses pay out of pocket. Also, this case is important to the criminal justice system, because criminal justice agencies are held to higher standards. These are the people and entities trusted to uphold the law. Because of this, their policies and actions must reflect their integrity and if not, this can damage the relationship the law enforcement agency has with the community.
A policing agency must have set policies that prevent supervisors from engaging in behavior that would create a hostile work environment and also have appropriate reporting procedures for employees who have been subject to harassment and need to lodge a complaint. Many employees simply do not report harassment because of fear of reprisal. They will either cope with it or resign and be done. By having these types of procedures in place, this would reduce the liability of a law enforcement agency simply under the Faragher/Ellerth criteria – the agency would just need to show there was policy in place to help prevent/combat harassment, and there is a reasonable method to report said harassment. This way, harassment issues can be dealt with in-house and there is no need for litigation. However, by defining and setting a standard for constructive discharge, this allows agencies, both public and private, to reconsider their policies and enact them in a more effective and productive manner.
Law enforcement agencies already have enough on their plate in the way of liability issues stemming from general interactions with the public. This is one area where they can obviate. Administrators, when training new employees, should have special training set aside simply for workplace harassment. There should also be intermittent training for existing employees on harassment policy. If there is an issue with harassment that has either been reported or witnessed without formal report, it should be addressed swiftly and decisively.


STANDARDS

This case creates a new standard for constructive discharge, where initially the employer harassed the employee to the point of resigning intentionally. Now, the standard for constructive discharge is that of simply creating a hostile and untenable working environment that causes the employee to resign.





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